Mutual Recognition Agreements and Harmonizationt
Linda Horton*

Food and drug law, a discrete specialty of American administrative law, increasingly involves international issues. At one time, these
issues had a rather narrow range of motion and focused principally
on long-standing import provisions' and legal aspects of "export policy" - should
the United States allow exports only of products al2
lowed here?
Food and drug lawyers in both the government and private sec-

tors, who once were able to spend most or all of their time concentrating on Food and Drug Administration (FDA or Agency) requirements and the U.S.
regulatory scheme, find that global
considerations increasingly influence their analysis of legal issues. In
law schools, as well, courses such as "food and drug law" that are not
part of the international and comparative law curriculum will delve
more and more into issues that reach across national boundaries.
This Article focuses on two related topics in the internationalization of food and drug law: harmonization and agreements, including
mutual recognition agreements (MRAs). It begins with a summary of
how food, drugs, and medical devices are regulated in the United

t Editor's Note: This article is based upon a presentation given at Seton Hall
University School of Law's Sixth Annual Health Law Symposium on March 13, 1998.
Linda Horton, Director, International Policy, U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and not necessarily those of the FDA.
See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) § 801(a), 21
U.S.C.
§ 381 (a) (1994); see also Linda R. Horton, The Food and Drug Administration'sInternational Harmonization,Enforcement, and Trade Policy Activities [hereinafter, FDLJ International Overview], in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW & REGULATION: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT
THERAPEUTIC PRODUCrS 101, 111, 131-35 (David L. Adams et al. eds., 1997)
[hereinafter 2 FUNDAMENTALS]; Linda R. Horton et al., InternationalHarmonization of
the Regulation of Drugs and Biologics [hereinafter, FDLI Drug Harmonization], in 2
FUNDAMENTALS 437, 518-24.
2 See FFDCA §§ 801(d), (e), 802, 21 U.S.C. §§ 381(d)-(e),
382 (1994); see also
Horton, FDLI InternationalOverview at 112; Horton, FDLI Drug Harmonizationat 52937; Linda R. Horton et al., InternationalHarmonization of Medical Device Regulations
[hereinafter, FDLI Device Harmonization], in 2 FUNDAMENTALS 555, 603-05. See infra
notes 65-70 and accompanying text (discussing the FDA's authority over exports).
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States by FDA. It continues with a discussion of FDA's philosophy
and authority concerning harmonization and agreements, and concludes with an examination of the Agency's policies in these areas
and recent and planned initiatives.
The United States and other countries have made remarkable
progress in a short time in global harmonization activities for food,
drugs, and medical devices. FDA's international harmonization activities comprise a wide variety of efforts to maintain and strengthen
public health safeguards while striving toward common ground internationally on product standards, criteria for the assessment of test
data, and enforcement procedures.
The recently completed MRA negotiation between the United
States and the European Union (EU) s on drugs and medical devices4
has generated much interest, and it provides a well-textured backdrop for a discussion of globalized food and drug law.
I.

A.

Globalization

The shift to an international legal perspective in the food and
drug law field reflects broad trends falling under the general rubric
of "globalization." These trends have compelled FDA, as well as the
industries it regulates and even consumer groups, to rethink their international strategies. Forces at work include:
" Economic globalization, evidenced by the growth of U.S. imports and exports; the increasingly international character of
products and industries that FDA regulates; and World Trade
Organization agreements;
" Public health globalization, and particularly the risk of crossborder spread of communicable diseases; and

The European Union (EU) is also known as the European Community. As of
1998, the EU comprises 15 countries, with another 10 or more hoping to join. Cur-

rent members are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the

United Kingdom.
4 A summary of the Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) is appended to
this
article. On June 20, 1997, representatives of the United States and the EU initialed
the agreement as an indication that the text was the one negotiated by the parties.

Thereafter, each side initiated its required ratification procedures, including an
FDA rulemaking as to drugs and devices. The parties signed the agreement on May
18, 1998, and exchanged letters on October 30, 1998, that triggered the entry into
force of the MRA. See infra text accompanying note 151.
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* The absolute certainty that available resources will not keep
pace with the challenges presented by these trends.
Provisions of the World Trade Organization agreements encourage harmonization and serve as stimuli for MRAs. These include:
5 which en" The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade,
courages mutual recognition agreements (in which countries
agree that exports will meet importing country's requirements), and
* The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures6 (referring to animal and plant health measures
as well as human food safety measures), which encourages
food safety control agencies to enter arrangements based
upon a finding that the exporting country's laws are equivalent. Here, countries agree that exports will meet the exporting country's requirements after a finding by the importing
country that the exporting country's requirements are equivalent to its own.7

Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, AGREEMENT ON THE APPuCATION OF SANITARY AND

MEAsuREs (available at <http://www.wto.org/wto/goods/spsagr.
htm>). A sanitary or phystosanitary measure is
any measure applied: (a) to protect animal or plant life or health
within the territory of the Member [a country or other entity, e.g., the
EU, belonging to the World Trade Organization] from risks arising
from the entry, establishment, or spread of pests, diseases, diseasecarrying organisms, or disease-causing organisms; (b) to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the Member from
risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages, or feedstuffs; (c) to protect human life or
health within the territory of the Member from risks arising from diseases carried by animals, plants, or products thereof, or from the entry, establishment, or spread of pests; or (d) to prevent or limit other
damage within their territory of the Member from the entry, establishment, or spread of pests.
Sanitary or phytosanitary measures include all relevant laws, decrees, regulations, requirements and procedures including, inter alia,
end product criteria; processes and production methods; testing; inspection; certification and approval procedures; quarantine treatments
including relevant requirements associated with the transport of animals or plants, or with the materials necessary for their survival during
transport; provisions on relevant statistical methods, sampling procedures, and methods of risk assessment; and packaging and labeling requirements directly related to food safety.
Id. annex A, at 78.
7 See id. art.
4.
PHYrOSANITARY
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B. How Food, Drugs, and MedicalDevices are Regulated in the
United States
FDA administers the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FFDCA) s and several other laws, notably provisions of the Public
Health Service Act.9 The Agency has existed for more than a century.' It is our nation's only significant regulatory body for pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and cosmetics, and it is the principal regulatory body for foods." FDA administers a national program, not one
organized by or carried out through the states; however, the Agency
does cooperate with state officials in a variety of productive ways.'2
8

21 U.S.C. §§ 321-397 (1994).

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 241 (research and investigations), 242(a) (controlled substances), 2421 (international cooperation), 262-263 (biological products), 264
(interstate and foreign infections disease control functions that relate to the law enforcement functions of FDA) (1994); see also 21 C.F.R. § 5.10(a) (1998).
10 FDA's predecessor, the Bureau of Chemistry of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, began in 1862 with President Lincoln's appointment of a chief chemist. See
FDA BACKGROUNDER (August 1995) (available at <http://www.fda.gov/opacom/
backgrounders/miles.html>). The Bureau's first regulatory authority was enacted in
1890, 26 Stat. 414 (1890), followed 16 years later by the enactment of the landmark
Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906). SeeAct of Aug.
30, 1890, ch. 839, 26 Stat. 414; Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34
Stat. 768 (1906) The modern era of U.S. food and drug regulation is considered to
begin with the 1906 law, which was replaced by the broader Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938). See Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938). In 1927,
the name "Food and Drug Administration" was assigned to the Agency, Pub. L. No.
71-272, 46 Stat. 392 (1930), and in 1940 FDA was transferred from the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) to the Federal Security Agency, the predecessor
to today's Department of Health and Human Services. See Act of May 27, 1930, ch.
341, Pub. L. No. 71-272, 46 Stat. 392.
1 Units of the U.S. Department of Agriculture have particular responsibilities
for food regulation. In particular, the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), is
the principal regulatory body for meat, poultry, and egg products. Also, the Environmental Protection Agency, an independent agency in the executive branch, registers pesticides and establishes tolerances for pesticides in food. FDA and FSIS enforce these tolerances.
12 FDA may commission state officials to enforce
the FFDCA. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 37 2(a) (1994). The individual states have significant activities involving food
(particularly restaurants and other food service establishments) in cooperation with
FDA and on their own. States regulate the practice of medicine and pharmacy and
conduct significant health fraud activities. See Richard M. Cooper, Introduction to
Food and Drug Law and Regulation, in FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION: AN INDEPTH LOOK AT FOODS, VETERINARY MEDICINES, AND COSMETICS, 11, 12 (Robert P.
Brady et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter 1 FUNDAMENTALS]. States rarely try to take on
the complex tasks of medical product approvals or inspection of manufacturing facilities. Concerning preemption, FDA-administered laws range from a general rule
of preemption (as to devices, nonprescription drugs, and cosmetics, 21 U.S.C.
§ 360k (1994); 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 379r, 379s (West Supp. 1998)), to a mixed approach
(as to food labeling and the drug requirements enacted in 1962 and codified in 21
9

696

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:692

FDA conducts its responsibilities not only through headquarters
functions located in Washington, D.C., and its Maryland suburbs, but
also through field offices all around the country. Establishment inspections are FDA's primary investigational technique. As discussed
in more detail below, FDA conducts foreign inspections, particularly
of manufacturers of drugs and devices, by sending investigators
abroad on specific assignments. FDA, however, does not post employees in other countries.
In general terms, food 14 and cosmetics 5 must be safe and prop. 17
erly labeled 6 and drugs and medical devices must be safe, effective,
and properly labeled."' Broadly, the Agency's activities include general regulations, approval requirements in certain areas, enforcement actions and voluntary compliance activities, and general information and education. FDA's regulations are found in Title 21 of the
Code of Federal Regulations, and these are supplemented by numerous non-binding explanatory documents known generally as guidance documents. 9 FDA prides itself on its transparency, both
through publications in the Federal Register and other publications,
such as its monthly magazine, FDA Consumer. The Agency's Internet homepage2 0 is also a rich source of information on the Agency, its
requirements, and its guidance documents. Procedural regulations'
U.S.C. § 343-1 (1994)) to statutory silence and, therefore, treatment under general
constitutional law and administrative law principles (food adulteration, biologics requirements) as illustrated in Hillsborough County, Floridav. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985). State laws may continue to provide traditional personal injury remedies involving FDA-regulated products, even where state regulation
generally is preempted. See Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
iS See Horton, FDLI InternationalOverview, supra note 1, at 135.
14
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 342, 346-348 (1994). It is actually shorthand to say that the
requires a food to be safe. The statute achieves this safety requirement in a backhand way by providing that a food is deemed "adulterated" and, therefore, subject to
enforcement action if it, inter alia, bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious
substance that may render it injurious to health. See id. § 342(a)(1).
15 See id. § 361(a).
16
See id. §§ 343, 362. A product is "misbranded," and therefore subject to enforcement action, if it is not labeled in accordance with requirements under the
statute. See id. §§ 343, 362.
1
See id. §§ 351, 355; 21 U.S.C.A. § 360c-e (West Supp. 1998).
18 See 21 U.S.C. § 352 (1994).
9 See Federal Food and Drug Administration's Development, Issuance, and Use
of Guidance Documents, 62 Fed. Reg. 8,961 (1997) (discussing the FDA's policy on
these issues). The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997
(FDAMA), Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 amended section 701 of the FFDCA
to codify FDA's policy on guidance documents and also to require the Agency to
promulgate this policy as a rule. See 21 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).
20 The Internet address for FDA is:
<http://www.fda.gov>.
2i
See 21 C.F.R. pts. 10-16 (1998).
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and public information2 regulations assist the public in interacting
with the Agency.
Good manufacturing practice (GMP) regulations have been issued for food, 23 drugs,2 4 and medical devices. 25

GMPs are practices

and procedures for manufacturing, processing, and packing these
products to ensure their quality and purity. FDA investigators conduct both periodic and "for cause" inspections of manufacturers for
compliance with GMPs. In the United States, failure to comply with
FDA's GMPs results in an adulterated product2 6 and can result in FDA
enforcement action, or voluntary action, that bars both domestic
shipments and entry of international shipments of affected prod2 71
UCtS.

GMP regulations are based on the premise that finished product
testing cannot suffice and that safety and quality must be built into
products. FDA's view is that it is impossible to assure that a food,
drug, or medical device possesses whatever characteristics the law requires it to have - safety for all products, identity/potency for drugs,
and adherence to product design specifications for devices - if there
has not been attention to controls on raw materials and labels, sanitation of the site, hygienic practices of production workers, record
keeping, lab tests to check in-process products at critical stages and to
check finished products, and other steps set forth in FDA regulations
and supplemented by the manufacturer's in-house procedures.
Plainly, not all finished products can be tested and to do so would be
to destroy the products. So, therefore, the processor must have in
place controls that result, reliably, in the production of only those
products that meet FDA requirements. In recent years, FDA investigators have paid particular attention to process validation, laboratory
See id. pt. 20.
23 See id. pt. 110 (setting forth the current good manufacturing
practice in manu-

facturing, packing, or holding human food). In addition, FDA has promulgated
specialized rules on product processing in Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations, for
certain food categories: dietary supplements (pt. 111), thermally processed low-acid
foods packaged in hermetically sealed containers (pt. 113), acidified foods (pt. 114),
fish and fishery products (pt. 123), and bottled water (pt. 129).
24 See id. pt. 210 (Current Good Manufacturing Practice in Manufacturing,
Processing, Packing, or Holding of Drugs; General); and pt. 211 (Current Good Manufacturing Practice for Finished Pharmaceuticals).
25 See id. pt. 820 (1998) (Quality system regulation).
26 See 21 U.S.C. § 351(a)
(1994).
27 See FFDCA § 301(a), 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (1994)
(prohibiting the introduction
or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of any adulterated or misbranded drug); FFDCA § 802(0 (1), 21 U.S.C. § 382(0 (1) (Supp. 1996) (prohibiting
exportation of a drug if it is not manufactured, processed, packaged, and held in
substantial conformity with good manufacturing practices (GMPs)).
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operations, bulk pharmaceuticals, and microbial contamination, and
FDA stresses these concerns in its work with other countries.
FDA's principal remedies in cases of noncompliance with
GMPs and other requirements are in rem product seizures, 30 injunc
tions, 3' and criminal prosecutions.32 FDA does not possess direct liti-

gating authority but it brings cases in the federal courts through the
Department of Justice."
Noncompliant imports are detained at
points of entry, through a program of cooperation between FDA and
customs officials of the Department of the Treasury.
For products
such as new drugs35 or certain medical devices3 6 that are subject to
approval requirements, denial or withdrawal of product marketing
authorizations can be the means for enforcement. The Agency also
has authority to undertake administrative embargoes of certain
products believed by investigators to violate the law.
Also, civil
money penalties may be assessed for certain violations, e.g., most violations involving medical devices. 38
Much compliance occurs through voluntary actions by responsible firms, often with the Agency's strong encouragement. FDA has
issued guidelines that govern recalls. 9 When products need to be
removed from the market, voluntary recalls are the principal means.
In some product areas - infant formula, 40 medical devices,4 ' biologics, 42 and radiation-emitting electronic products43 FDA has
28
2.
30

See Horton, FDLI Drug Harmonization,in 2 FUNDAMENTALS, supra note
1, at 508.
Prohibited acts are listed in 21 U.S.C. § 331 (1994).
See id. § 334.

31 See id. § 332.
32

See id. § 333.

33 See id. § 335.

See id. § 381.
See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1994).
36 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 360c(a)(1)(C), 360e (West
Supp. 1998).
37 FDA possesses administrative embargo, or administrative
detention, authority
for devices, see 21 U.S.C. § 334(g) (1994) and, pursuant to authority shared with the
USDA, for meat, poultry, and egg products, see id. §§ 679(b), 467f(b), 1031.
38 See id. § 333(f).
FDA has issued a procedural regulation governing its civil
money penalty authorities. See 21 C.F.R. pt. 17 (1998).
In this regulation, the
Agency lists the statutory provisions that are governed by these procedures. See 21
C.F.R. § 17.1 (1998).
39 See 21 C.F.R. pt. 7(C) (1998).
40 See 21 U.S.C. § 350a(e)(1) (1994).
41 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 360h(e) (West Supp. 1998); 21 C.F.R. pt. 810 (1998).
42 See 42 U.S.C. § 262(d)(2) (1994).
Biologics (e.g., vaccines, blood-derived
34

35

products, and allergenic extracts) comprise a specialized category of medical products that are principally regulated under provisions first enacted in 1902, now found
in section 351 of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 262(d) (2) (1994), as well
as relevant provisions of the FFDCA.
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authority to order recalls. Even where FDA lacks authority to order
recalls, it may issue binding regulations requiring record keeping
and product coding that is needed for effective recalls." In many
cases, legal actions are obviated through some combination of warning letters and voluntary actions.45
Some products require FDA approval before marketing. Examples are new drugs6 and certain medical devices.
Support for approval is marshaled through laboratory research, animal studies, and
clinical investigations in human subjects done by product sponsors,
not by FDA. 48 The information is combined in an application for
FDA consideration under the relevant statutory and regulatory criteria. Often FDA guidance documents make suggestions about what
kinds of tests are needed, and direct communications between FDA
and product sponsors help assure that investigations are undertaken
that will satisfy requirements. 49 Thus, FDA's work is not to test products as a prelude to market authorization, but to grant approval
based upon the Agency's review of data generated in studies conducted by, or for, product sponsors. The Agency tests products only
as part of its general surveillance responsibilities.
C. FDA Authority over Imports
Under FFDCA and other laws administered by FDA,'0 both domestic and foreign suppliers that furnish products to the U.S. market
must meet the same requirements. 5' These requirements apply not
only with respect to products themselves, but also to the conditions
under which the products were processed or stored, as these conditions determine the characteristics of the products. Thus, foreign
producers that ship to the United States, as well as domestic ones, are
43
'A

See 21 U.S.C. § 36011(1994).
See National Confectioners Ass'n. v. Califano, 569 F.2d 690, 695 (D.C. Cir.

1978).

45 See I. Scott Bass, Enforcement Powers of the Food and Drug Administration:
Drugs
and Devices, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS 55, 68-70.
See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1994).
47 See id. §§ 360(c), 360(e).
48 See id. §§ 355(i), 360j(g); see also Geoffrey M. Leavitt et al., Human
Drug Regula-

tion, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS 159, 160-66.
49 As is discussed in the text, infra, accompanying notes 123-26,
increasingly
these guidance documents on testing requirements are being written in transnational international harmonization activities.
Similarly as to biological products, the Public Health Service Act provides for
inspections of all licensed firms, whether domestic or foreign. This provision dates
back to 1902. See 42 U.S.C. § 262 (1994).
5
See21 U.S.C. § 381(a) (1994).
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expected to maintain sanitary establishments: the FFDCA bars from
U.S. commerce a food, drug, device, or cosmetic that is adulterated
because it has been prepared, packed, or held under insanitary conditions whereby it may have become contaminated with filth, or it
may have been rendered injurious to health. This requirement is
mentioned not only in the Act's adulteration provisions," but also in
its import provisions 54 - thus affording U.S. consumers the same
protective provisions, with respect to the conditions under which imported products are processed or held, as apply to domestically produced products. Regardless of whether the insanitary conditions
were here in the United States, in a processing facility in another
country preparing products for export to the United States,55 or in
transit from there to here, the law prohibits the shipment
in inter56
state commerce of adulterated or misbranded products.
In sum, foreign firms are expected to meet the same product
requirements and the same GMP regulations as domestic firms must
meet.5 1 Importing countries must concern themselves with the conditions of processing in the country of origin. An agency like FDA
cannot test every import. Moreover, testing of product samples is
useful in some areas, e.g., checking for illegal pesticide residues, but
in most instances is not an effective way of looking for processing deficiencies that could result in hazardous product characteristics such
as microbial contamination or subpotent or superpotent drugs. 8
See id. Furthermore, foreign suppliers' compliance with device GMPs is specifically required. See id.
53 See id. §§ 342(a) (4), 351(a) (4),
361(a).
54 See id. § 381(a).
55 See id. § 381. Cf United States v. Food, 2,988 Cases, 64 F.3d 984, 986 (5th
Cir.
1995) (discussing government seizing of imported canned Chinese mushrooms).
56
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 381 (1994).
57 See id. § 381(a).
The FDA Drug Export Reform and Enhancement Act of
1996, contains provisions that allow importation of certain ingredients that do not
meet FDA requirements for inclusion in products for export only. See FDA Drug
Export Reform and Enhancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321313 (1996).
Also, testing at a country's borders adds costs to imports and can result in loss
of perishable goods that may ultimately be found to comply with the FFDCA. Often
there are no test methods, or only slow or cumbersome methods, to detect microbial
contaminants in food. Recently, as part of the Administration's Food Safety Initiative, the President sent to Congress proposed legislation to strengthen FDA's authority over imported food. This bill would give FDA explicit authority to deny entry to
food from a country whose regulatory system does not provide for a level of protection provided in the United States. The legislation has been introduced in the
House of Representatives by Representatives Eshoo and Pallone, see Safety of Imported Food Act of 1997, H.R. 3052, 105th Cong., and in the Senate by Senator
Mikulski, see Safety of Imported Food Act of 1998, S.1707, 105th Cong.
52
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D. ForeignInspections
Related to the issue of import control at the border is foreign inspection. FDA conducts inspections of foreign manufacturers as well
as domestic firms, particularly as to drugs and devices. The President's Food Safety Initiative will result in some increase in international inspections and related activities, such as technical cooperation and assistance in the food area. At present, however, drug and
device inspections comprise almost all of FDA's foreign inspections..
In recent years, the number of foreign inspections involving drugs
has increased significantly, from 156 in 1992 to nearly 500 in 1995.
The resources devoted to all foreign inspections have also increased,
from eight full-time equivalents in 1992, to 47.5 in 1996. As mentioned earlier, the FFDCA applies equally to the products of domestic
and foreign drug manufacturers. The Agency's authority to deny entry to imported products that "appear" to be adulterated, misbranded, or in violation of the new drug provisions 9 has been interpreted as enabling the Agency to deny entry to products produced in
facilities (or in countries) that have denied FDA investigators the
right of inspection.
Over the years, FDA has conducted inspections of approximately
4,200 firms in seventy-two different countries. Traditionally, most inspections have been in European countries, although a significant
number occur in Canada, China, Japan, Thailand, Mexico, Malaysia,
and Korea. FDA conducts these inspections in response to applications or submissions from or involving foreign firms 6° and investigations of complaints or recalls. The Agency also conducts routine and
follow-up inspections. 6' As in the case of domestic inspections, foreign inspections involve discussions with firms' management, responses to deficiencies, inspection observations, 62detailed written reports, and review by FDA headquarters offices. However, unlike
FDA's traditional domestic inspections, which have not been preannounced, foreign inspections occur only after FDA has provided
prior notice to the firm to be inspected. FDA's foreign inspectors, in
most cases, are senior investigators who are technically experienced
and competent in their fields, able to work independently, capable of
See 21 U.S.C. § 381 (1994).
The foreign firm is either the applicant or the source of the bulk drug identified in an application. In the United States, as well as in other countries, foreign
firms are a significant source of bulk drugs.
61 FDA conducts some inspections if a foreign firm has
made a bid to supply
products or is a supplier to the U.S. military.
62 FDA uses a form known as FDA-483 to
record inspectional findings.
59
W
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handling difficult situations, and diplomatic. The typical foreign inspection trip lasts three to four weeks, with two to five inspections per
trip, and covers more than one country.
In the area of drugs, a foreign inspection often involves one or
more of the following areas: administrative information, raw materials (handling, storage, controls, etc.), production operations
(standard operating procedures, validation, production records,
packaging and labeling, facilities, equipment, and maintenance), and
product testing (procedures and methods). If any type of official
FDA action results against the foreign firm, the action usually consists
of automatic detention of the firm's products or disapproval of the
relevant application or submission.
In June 1997, FDA issued a report on foreign inspections. This
report was the product of a Task Force directed by the Deputy Commissioner for Operations. The report made several recommendations for approaches that FDA could use to evaluate the status of foreign establishments that manufacture products for import into the
United States:
* Use of risk-based criteria for prioritizing the foreign firms
that will be inspected;
" Implementation of the new Field Accomplishment and Compliance Tracking System, which will contain one combined
Official Establishment Inspection for all foreign and domestic
firms, comparable with other systems, and will provide the
regulatory history of each firm;
" Providing information to U.S. customers regarding the status
of products on Import Alert via direct mailings, Internet, and
publication in the Federal Register;
* Continuing efforts to improve communications with the public health components of foreign governments in an effort to
broaden inspectional information exchange; and
* Implementing a statistically based sampling program using a
risk-management strategy built on criteria that will help target
resources on products that are most likely to fail inspection.
Although FDA conducts foreign inspections, and will continue
to do so, FDA and its counterparts in foreign countries are striving to
harmonize regulatory requirements, to engage in cooperative regulatory activities such as joint training and inspections, and to look for
ways to rely upon one another's efforts, e.g., by exchanging inspectional results. Because resources for FDA's foreign inspection program will never be sufficient to provide the degree of inspectional
coverage for foreign processors commensurate with programmatic
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needs, FDA needs to increase these international activities. That
need should be kept in mind in connection with the later discussion
on the subject of agreements.
E. Exchange of Information About Inspections
FDA shares information about its inspections through a variety
of formal and informal arrangements. First, much information about
FDA inspections is public and is shared with other countries upon
request. Second, even non-public information can be shared, provided the requirements in FDA's regulations are met. 63 Third,
through the Compliance Status Information System (COMSTAT),
discussed below, certain countries have arranged for direct access to
an FDA computerized database that includes information as to
whether U.S. and foreign firms inspected by FDA are in compliance
with GMPs. Last, but not least, FDA enters into Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) and MRAs with other countries in order to enhance cooperation, sharing of compliance information, and reliance
upon inspections by foreign counterparts.
COMSTAT, developed in the early 1970s as a computerized database on the current GMP status of pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers, repackers, assemblers, contract sterilizers, and
control testing laboratories, now includes information on some
20,000 firms that FDA has inspected in the United States or abroad.
Originally aimed at providing timely information to U.S. procurement agencies about manufacturers' compliance status,
COMSTAT also assists FDA headquarters and other government
agencies to assess quickly the GMP compliance status of a firm.
COMSTAT is a profile class-oriented system not a product-specific
system. In other words, in providing GMP compliance status information, COMSTAT does not provide information on each product a
manufacturer makes, but rather categorizes pharmaceuticals and
medical devices into broad categories, such as drug dosage forms,
and provides compliance status information based on available inspection information.
In addition to U.S. government agencies, the drug approval
authorities in Australia, Canada, and Denmark are able to access the
COMSTAT database directly. The foreign agencies are able to obtain only publicly available information through this direct access,
under FDA's regulation on sharing non-public information with for-

63

See 21 C.F.R. pt. 20 (1998), particularly § 20.89.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

704

[Vol. 29:692

eign officials, although follow-up inquiries could yield needed information not available to the public. 4
F. FDA Authority over Exports
FDA's authority extends to exports,65 but is more limited than is
the case for domestically produced products and imports. A food,
drug, or medical device that meets the requirements of the FFDCA,
and thus is eligible for commercial distribution within the United
States, generally may be exported without any FDA approval or involvement." As to a product intended for export that could not otherwise be commercially distributed within the United States because
it would be considered either adulterated or misbranded, the general
rule is that the product may nevertheless be exported if it: "(A) accords to the specifications of the foreign purchaser, (B) is not in conflict with the laws of the country [of destination], (C) is labeled on
the outside of the shipping package that it is intended for export,
67'
and (D) is not sold or offered for sale in domestic commerce.
Thus, in a nutshell, the exporter shipping products from the United
States must comply either with FDA's laws or with the laws of the importing country.
Additional requirements apply to the export of unapproved new
drugs, biologics, and medical devices subject to pre-market approval
application requirements. The law differentiates between exports of
unapproved products to highly developed countries listed in the
FFDCA,M which are minimally regulated, and those destined for
other countries. 69 Although the FDA Export Reform and Enhance64
65

See id. § 20.89.
For a discussion of FDA's authority over exports, see Horton, FDLI Drug Har-

monization, in 2

FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 1, at 524-36, 602-05.
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 381-382 (1994).
67 Id. §
381(e).
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 382(b) (West Supp. 1998). Listed countries are Australia,
Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, South Africa, and the countries of
the EU and the European Economic Area (EEA). See id. At the time the FDA Export Reform and Enhancement Act became law, there were 15 countries in the EU.
See FDA Export Reform and Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 313.
The EEA countries were the EU countries, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway.
Note that, because section 382 (b) (1) (A) (i) of the FFDCA refers to the EU and EEA,
rather than their individual members, the ranks of the listed countries will automatiV,

callz expand as nations accede to the EU or join the EEA.
See 21 U.S.C. § 382 (1994).

The export provisions of the FFDCA were over-

hauled in the FDA Export Reform and Enhancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104134, 110 Stat. 1321-313 (1996) amended by Pub. L. No. 104-180, 110 Stat. 1569 (1996).
See generally Linda R. Horton, Ethics and Trade: Exports of Unapproved Pharmaceuticals
and Medical Devices, 15 MED. & L. 649 (1996).
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ment Act,' ° passed in 1996, made significant changes in these requirements, this law retained a provision requiring unapproved drug
exports, and device exports under that provision, to meet GMPs. In
the context of an MRA, it obviously is important for FDA to possess
the legal authority needed to enforce compliance by U.S. exporting
firms with GMPs.
G. Features of Other Countries' Regulatory Systems Relevant to
Harmonization and Agreements
In many countries, GMPs and inspections are an essential part of
the control of food, drugs, and medical devices. In other countries,
as in the United States, an additional food safety control system
known as Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points7' is being widely
adopted. 72
Inspections are recognized as an essential component of a drug
regulatory system by member states of the EU and other countries.
The EU's legal basis for inspection is laid down in several laws and
guidelines. 7 The European Commission is responsible for the harmonization of inspection procedures and technical matters, the
European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products is responsible for coordinating national inspections and pharmacovigilance,
and the "supervisory authorities" in the member states are responsible for conducting inspections of manufacturers located within their

70 Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-313 (1996), amended by Pub.
L. No. 104-

180, 110 Stat. 1569 (1996).

71 Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP)
is a scientific, preventive approach to food safety. To develop and maintain a HACCP system, a food producer
identifies both the significant hazards posed by a product and process and what preventive or control measures must be put in place to control those hazards. A decision as to whether a hazard is significant depends on both the likelihood of occurrence and the severity of the hazard if it were to occur. Next, the producer identifies
the "critical control points," the points in the process where significant hazards can
be controlled, as well as the critical limits for the preventive measures for each such
point. HACCP also contemplates requirements that the food producer have in
place systems for monitoring, record keeping, assurance that the system is working
through testing and other means, and corrective actions. For further discussion, see
Frederick H. Degnan, The Regulation of Food Safety, 1 FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 12, at
161, 175-76. See also Phillip C. Olsson & Dennis R. Johnson, Meat and Poultry Inspection: Wholesomeness, Integrity, and Productivity, 1 FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 12 at 205,
230-31. The author is indebted to the latter authors' summary of HACCP.
72 HACCP has been required for seafood, 21 C.F.R. pt. 123 (1998), and for
meat
and poultry, 61 Fed. Reg. 38, 806 (1996).
See Council Directive 75/319, amended by Council Directive 89/341,
1989 O.J.
(L 142) 32; see also Council Directive 91/356, 1991 O.J. (L 193) 34; Council Regulation 93/2309, 1993J.O. (L214) 36.
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borders.7 4 In the EU, inspection is ordinarily conducted by a qualified individual employed by the responsible agency in the country
where the facility is located, but the inspection is on behalf of the EU
as a whole, not simply that member state.75 For imported drugs,
batch testing by a qualified person in the member state where the
product enters is contemplated, although foreign inspections can
also be conducted when requested by a member state, the European
Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, or the European
Commission. Three member states (U.K., Germany, and France)
have done foreign inspections. 77
Although it is the opinion of the author that no other country
has a drug or medical device approval system as rigorous as that of
FDA, a convergence of regulatory controls of drugs and medical devices is occurring on such basics as GMPs, international product
standards, and adverse event reporting. For pharmaceuticals, harmonization and technical cooperation activities by the World Health
Organization over the past half century have resulted in widespread
consensus on these basics as well as product identity and quality requirements, basic registration to control what is on the market, labeling, and GMPs.78 Testing guidelines are also now being harmonized,
as discussed below. Not all countries are attempting to maintain fullfledged approval systems; others rely upon certificates or other evidence of marketing eligibility in the United States and other countries.' What sets FDA apart from the drug approval authorities of
other economically developed countries is its interest in scrutiny, not
only of summaries of investigations, but also of the studies themselves, 0 including the clinical reports themselves in many cases.
For medical devices, FDA maintains a government-based approval system with a small proportion of devices requiring full-blown
Pre-market Approval Applications, a fairly large proportion requiring
74 See Karin Bredal Jensen, National Board of Health, Denmark,
Good Manufacturing PracticeInspection in Europe, In Light of the New Central Agency and Current InternationalAgreements,29 DRUG INFO.J. 1211, 1211-16 (1995).
75 See Philippe Meyer, European Commission, The Future GMP Inspection System

(Inside and Outside the European Community): What Does it Really Mean?, 28 DRUG INFO.
J. 977, 979 (1994).
76 SeeJensen, supra note 74, at 1212-13.
77 See id. at 1213.
78 See Horton, FDLI Drug Harmonization,
supranote 1, at 451-53.
79 See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR SMALL
NATIONAL
DRUG REGULATORYAUTHORITIES, 3 WHO DRUG INFORMATION 43 (1989).
80 See Janet Woodcock, M.D., Director, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, FDA, Address at the Meeting of the Center for Drug and Evaluation Research's International Activities Advisory Committee (Aug. 7, 1998).
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pre-market notifications or "510(k)s," and a substantial number of
the simpler devices exempted from both approval and pre-market
notification. The review of the 510(k) looks principally at whether
the device is substantially equivalent to one marketed already. The
main competing paradigm is the medical device regulatory system in
the EU, which includes vesting pre-market approval authority in conformity assessment bodies (CABs), many of them in the private sector, known as "Notified Bodies.0' These bodies are hired by sponsors and are responsible for reviewing products and ascertaining
compliance with EU laws. The regulatory authorities in health ministries of member countries of the EU retain key responsibilities other
than product approval - particularly in naming the bodies that are
eligible, and in conducting post-market surveillance.
In 1995, FDA announced its interest in experimenting with the
use of "third-party" review bodies for medical devices.
The FDA
Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA) a' codified and expanded FDA's
pilot program . 84 Under both the pilot program and FDAMA program, FDA decides which devices are eligible,85 selects the eligible
participating bodies through an accreditation process, and makes final approval decisions in all cases on devices.86

81The term "Notified Body" is based upon the fact that each EU member country is required to notify the European Commission of all Conformity Assessment
Bodies found to possess the technical competence to carry out conformity assessment functions under the relevant EU directive.

See THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, REINVENTING DRUG AND
DEVICE REGULATIONS 5, 20-21 (1995). FDA announced its pilot program in the Fed82

eral Register of April 3, 1996. See 61 Fed. Reg. 14,789 (1996).
85 Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Star.
2296 (1997).
84
During the early stages of Congressional consideration of the legislation that
became FDAMA, Congress considered adoption of a system more closely linked to
the EU system. A General Accounting Office report during consideration of
FDAMA was probably influential in the adoption of a more limited use of third-party
"Accredited Persons," as now found in 21 U.S.C.A. § 360m. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION:
SYSTEM'S VALUE As MODEL FOR FDA (1996).

Too EARLY TO ASSESS EUROPEAN

The devices that were eligible for the pilot study represented those whose reviews are in the intermediate range of complexity: they were not the lowest risk devices exempted from 510(k)s, nor were they the devices that due to novelty, risk, or
similar factors must be the subject of Pre-Market Approval Applications or FDAreviewed 510(k)s.
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 360m (West Supp. 1998). FDA published a draft guidance
on this program in the Federal Register of May 22, 1998. See 63 Fed. Reg. 28,392
(1998). Related draft guidance on the implementation of the sectoral annex on
medical devices of the United States-EU MRA was published on July 2, 1998. See 63
Fed. Reg. 36,240 (1998).
85
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II.
A.

Recent Changes in FDA 's Authorityfor InternationalActivities:
FDAMA

FDAMA made several changes in the law relevant to international harmonization and agreements. First, FDAMA placed harmonization policy squarely in FDA's statutory mission statement,
which before FDAMA included two broad goals: (1) timely action on
the marketing of regulated products, and (2) protecting the public
health by assuring that foods and cosmetics are safe and properly labeled, that human and veterinary drugs are safe and effective, and
that there is reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of
devices.

7

With

FDAMA,

FDA is given

a

third

objective

of

"participat[ing] through appropriate processes with representatives
of other countries to reduce the burden of regulation, harmonize
regulatory requirements, and achieve appropriate reciprocal arrangements. '88 Both the original two goals and the new one are, "as
determined to be appropriate by [FDA, to be carried out] in consultation with experts in science, medicine, and public health, and in
cooperation with consumers, users, manufacturers, importers, packers, distributors, and retailers of regulated products."
Second, FDAMA added new provisions to an internationallyoriented, medical device-specific section that had been added to the
FFDCA in 1990 by the 1990 Safe Medical Devices Act.90 The FDAMA
provisions require FDA to "regularly participate in meetings with
representatives of other foreign governments to discuss and reach
agreement on methods and approaches to harmonize regulatory requirements"9 ' and to
support the Office of the United States Trade Representative, in
consultation with the Department of Commerce, in meetings with
See 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(1)-(2) (1994).
21 U.S.C.A. § 393(b) (3) (West Supp. 1998).
89 Id. § 393(b) (4).
90 Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511 (1990). The Safe Medical Devices
Act
added section 803 to the FFDCA, which established an Office of International Relations (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 383(a) (1994)) and provided that, "In carrying out the
functions of the office... [FDA] may enter into agreements with foreign countries
to facilitate commerce in devices between the United States and such countries consistent with the requirements of [the FFDCA]." 21 U.S.C. § 383(b) (1994). "In such
87

agreements, the Secretary shall encourage the mutual recognition of - (1) good
manufacturing practice regulations [for devices], and (2) other regulations and testing protocols as [FDA] determines to be appropriate." Id.
21 U.S.C.A. § 383(b) (3) (West Supp. 1998).
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representatives of other countries to discuss methods and approaches to reduce the burden of regulation and harmonize
regulatory requirements if [FDA] determines that such harmonization continues 92consumer protections consistent with the purposes of this Act.

Third, FDAMA carried over FDA's authority for entering into
cooperative arrangements with other countries on drug and device
inspections 3 and on device MRAs.94 Also, FDAMA added to the law a
provision on agreements with the EU in particular: the provision requires FDA to
support the Office of the United States Trade Representative, in
consultation with the [Department] of Commerce, in efforts to
move toward the acceptance of mutual recognition agreements
relating to the regulation of drugs, biological products, devices,
foods, food additives, and color additives, and the regulation of
good manufacturing practices, between the EU and the United
States.-5

92 Id. § 383(c)(1).
Congress exempted dietary supplements from the new directives concerning harmonization and agreements. Congress had concerns that harmonization of U.S. regulatory approaches for these products - the subject of a deregulatory statute known as the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of
1994 - could result in a tightening of regulatory requirements in the U.S. if FDA
were to follow the lead of countries that regulate vitamin and mineral products as
drugs. See Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103417, 108 Stat. 4325. This 1994 statute "clarif[ied] that dietary supplements are not
drugs or food additives, that dietary supplements should not be regulated as drugs,
and that burden of proof is on the Food and Drug Administration... to prove that a
product is unsafe before it can be removed from the marketplace." S. REP. No. 103410, at 2 (1994).
93
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 360(i) (West Supp. 1998). 21 U.S.C.A. § 360(i) (3) states
that, "[FDA] is authorized to enter into cooperative arrangements with officials of
foreign countries to ensure that adequate and effective means are available for purposes of determining, from time to time, whether drugs or devices manufactured,
prepared, propagated, compounded, or processed by an establishment [in any foreign country engaged in the manufacture, preparation, propagation, compounding
or processing of a drug or device that is imported or offered for import into the
United States], if imported or offered for import into the United States, shall be refused admission on any of the grounds set forth in section 381 (a) of this title [on
imports]." 21 U.S.C.A. § 360(i)(3) (West Supp. 1998). This provision was recodifled as new subsection (3) of section 381 (a) as part of amendments that, for the first
time, require all foreign drug and device manufacturers to register. Before, registration with FDA was optional for foreign firms. However, even before this change in
the law, all firms, domestic and foreign, had to file product lists with FDA. See 21
U.S.C. § 360(j) (1994).
94 See 21 U.S.C. § 383(b) (1994); see supra note 90 for text of 21 U.S.C.
§ 383(b).
95 21 U.S.C.A. § 383(c) (2) (West Supp. 1998).
As noted in footnote 93, dietary
supplements are exempt from this provision.
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Additionally, FDAMA required FDA, within 180 days of the enactment of the law, to make public a plan for a framework for achieving mutual recognition of GMP inspections. 6
Finally, two changes facilitated international harmonization and
agreements in the devices area. A simple process for recognition of
international device standards was provided,97 and, as discussed earlier, FDA's third-party pilot program for device reviews was codified
in the FFDCA.9 8
B. FDA Authority for InternationalActivities: Harmonization
Harmonization authority is not a separate and mysterious mandate, but is part and parcel of the Agency's general authority for
regulations, approvals, enforcement, and other activities. International activities that are consistent with the statutes the Agency administers and that support the Agency's purposes, may be undertaken by FDA, under the product-specific provisions of the law as well
as general mandates such as the Agency's broad rulemaking authority under section 701 (a) of the FFDCA. 99 For example, FDA can undertake rulemaking that brings its regulations in line with an international standard, so long as the resulting regulation is consistent with
applicable statutes. Thus, international harmonization in the United
States is achieved by use of the same processes, under the Administrative Procedure Act' °° and Agency administrative procedure requirements, 1 for issuance of harmonized rules and guidance documents as those that govern other Agency policy making. When FDA
wishes to accept an international standard, rulemaking is required in
some instances, while in others harmonization is achieved through
identical or similar guidance documents. For example, FDA used
rulemaking under a long-established statutory process 02 to adopt an
internationally recognized quality systems approach in its medical

96 See id. § 383(c) (4); see infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text for this plan.
97 See 21 U.S.C. § 360d(c) (1994). FDA made use of this provision through
a
draft guidance document listing a large number of device standards used by FDA
reviewers. See 63 Fed. Reg. 9,561 (1998). Nomination of other standards for use by
FDA was invited, and FDA recently published an expanded list of recognized standards. See FDA Modernization Act of 1997: Modifications to the List of Recognized
Standards, 63 Fed. Reg. 55,617, 55,619 to 55,630 (1998).
98 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 360m (West Supp. 1998); see also supra notes 84-86.

vi See 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1994).
,00 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1994).
101FDA's rules on administrative practices and procedures are set forth in 21

C.F.R. pts. 10-17 (1998).
102 See 21 U.S.C. § 360j(f) (1994).
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device GMP regulations.0 3 However, where a binding requirement is
not needed to fulfill public health objectives, e.g., most harmonized
guidelines on drug testing, FDA publishes a draft guidance document in the Federal Register for public comment. After considering
comments, within the Agency and in concert with international partners, FDA publishes a final guidance document in the Federal Register. An illustration of this process is the International Cooperation
on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH), discussed below.
C. FDA Authorityfor InternationalActivities: Agreements with
Regulatory Counterpartsin Other Countries0°
As with FDA's harmonization authority, discussed above, FDA's
authority to enter agreements with foreign government agencies derives in part from a broad reading of the FFDCA and other statutes
that FDA administers. Section 801 on imports allows decisions on
imports to be made on the basis of examination of samples "or othth extent that an MOU with another country helps
erwise. ,,105 To the
FDA to protect channels of commerce from violative products, the
Agency's general authority to prevent violations also comes into
play.- 6 Furthermore, FDA possesses broad authority under several
sections of the Public Health Service Act that also authorize agreements with other countries: section 301 (granting broad authority
for public health cooperation); section 307 (authorizing international cooperation); section 351 (controlling biological products,
most of which are also drugs or medical devices, e.g., certain in vitro
diagnostic products and tissue-derived devices); and section 361
(authorizing regulations to control communicable disease)

7

FDA

has additional, product-specific authority to enter MOUs on food,
drugs, and devices.'0 8 As discussed in this Article, FDAMA added to
103 See 21 C.F.R. pt. 820 (1998).
104 An FDA regulation, 21 C.F.R. § 20.89
(1998), allows FDA to give and receive
confidential information with counterparts, without that information becoming
available to the general public. For an interesting discussion of confidentiality of
business information, see generally James T. O'Reilly, Implications of International
Drug Approval Systems on Confidentiality of Business Secrets in the U.S. PharmaceuticalIndustry, 53 FOOD& DRUG L.J., 123 (1998).
See 21 U.S.C. § 381(a) (1994).
See, e.g., United States v. Food, 2998 Cases, 64 F.3d 984 (5th Cir. 1995).
107
See42 U.S.C. §§ 241, 2421, 262, 264 (1994).
108 See, e.g., Pesticide Monitoring Improvements Act of 1988, 21 U.S.C. §§ 14011403 (1994). This act directs FDA to enter into cooperative agreements with the
governments of countries that are the major sources of food imports into the United
States, subject to pesticide residue monitoring by FDA for the purpose of improving
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the Agency's authority to enter into agreements as well as harmonization activities. 09
International law and domestic law both come into play with respect to international agreements. Under both, what is important is
the substance of the document rather than the name put on it (or its
form, i.e., contract form versus exchange of letters). International
law, in particular the law of treaties, has evolved over many centuries
and has been codified in the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties. Although the U.S. Senate has not ratified the Vienna Convention, it is very influential in the interpretation of international
agreements in the United States. The Vienna Convention by its
terms applies only to binding international agreements; it is nevertheless referred to in the interpretation of agreements whether or
not they are binding. When the U.S. State Department clears agreements with other countries, as discussed below, one of the main
things it reviews is whether an agency is entering a commitment under international law and whether the agency has authority for the
agreement in question, be it binding or non-binding.
Under U.S. law, there are four categories of international
agreements:
" Treaties that must be ratified by a two-thirds vote of the Senate;
" Executive-legislative agreements that, due to statutes or custom are, after negotiation by the executive branch, the subject of legislation that must be passed by both houses of Congress by a simple majority, then presented to the President for
his signature (trade agreements fall in this category);
" Presidential agreements under the President's constitutional
powers, such as his powers as Commander-in-Chief, without
need for Congress to enact legislation (this is a small category
that is quite controversial with the Congress); and
" Executive branch agreements that are negotiated and entered
under an agency's statutory authority (the category that is by
far the most numerous).
FDA's agreements fall into the latter category, executive branch
agreements, the authority for which derives from the statutes it administers, principally the FFDCA and the Public Health Service Act.
ability to assure compliance with the pesticide tolerance requirements of the FFDCA
with respect to imported food. See id. § 1402. As to drugs and devices, section
510(1) (3) of the FFDCA includes explicit provisions for agreements with other countries. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 360(i) (3) (West Supp. 1998).
109 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 383, 393 (1994).
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FDA's agreements with regulatory counterparts are typical of the
agency-to-agency agreements that are dominant in today's world of
"technical diplomacy." FDA clears its proposed agreements with foreign counterparts with the Department of State, under procedures
governing clearance of Agency agreements known as the Circular
175 process. The legal basis for this process is the State Department's
need to comply with a statute, the Case-Zablocki Act,"l which requires the State to inform the Congress of executive branch agreements with other countries that were not submitted to the Senate as
treaties for ratification under the U.S. Constitution.
Most FDA agreements are not binding. Usually neither FDA nor
the foreign counterpart wants an agreement that has mandatory language in it. Furthermore, the U.S. Department of State generally
looks for, and strikes out, mandatory language unless it is satisfied
that the Agency possesses the authority to enter into an agreement
with such language and intends the international commitment being
undertaken. As with agreements of all sorts, FDA's non-binding
agreements bond the participants in a joint venture toward mutually
beneficial goals: this is their value.
Recently FDA has negotiated several agreements that include
binding provisions: The MRA signed with the EU in 1998, discussed
below, is a good example. FDA's authority under its statutes to enter
into non-binding agreements is long-established.
The Agency's
authority to enter into binding agreements is a relatively new issue.
Both FDA's Office of Chief Counsel and the State Department have
cleared the MRA with the EU, on the basis that the same authority
that empowers FDA to enter into non-binding agreements with regulatory counterparts also authorizes entering into binding ones.
The inclusion of binding features has implications under domestic administrative law. An agreement that binds an agency such
as FDA may need to be the subject of notice-and-comment rulemaking. " One view is that FDA has the authority to enter into binding
0

1 U.S.C. § 112b (1994), implemented at 22 C.F.R. pt. 181 (1998).

Cf Richard A. Merrill, FDA and Mutual Recognition Agreements: Five Models of
Harmonization, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 133, 135 (1998); David A. Wirth, International
Trade Agreements: Vehicles for Regulatory Reform?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 331, 331
(1997). Wirth explained:
As more and more domestic regulatory issues concerning environment
and public health become "internationalized" through trade agreements, as they have, it is only reasonable to expect a degree of... legal
culture surrounding those issues domestically. If the Executive Branch
does not undertake such an initiative on its own, then Congress, which
has the exclusive, expressly enumerated constitutional authority to
regulate international trade, ought to address the need by statute.
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agreements with other regulatory counterparts in other countries,
provided that the Agency goes through notice-and-comment rulemaking on the basis that the agreement and aspects of it constitute
"binding norms" with respect to FDA."' FDA published the MRA
with the EU in the Federal Register in the form of a proposed regulation, seeking public comment,' then as a 4 final regulation that is
codified in the Code of Federal Regulations.1
An alternative theory is that international agreements, even executive branch agreements under Agency statutory authority, are a
separate species of decision than rules, orders, or other products of
U.S. administrative procedure and do not need to be subject to a notice-and-comment process. There is some support for this view in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Pena,' 5 in which the Teamsters
union brought an unsuccessful challenge to a Department of Transportation finding that Mexican truck drivers' licenses are equivalent
to U.S. licenses.
What is the practical consequence of the distinction between a
binding and non-binding agreement? In the context of agreements
on food, drugs, and devices, probably not much. The practical reality is that, in contrast to commercial contracts between buyers and
sellers of goods, there is not a "world FDA" or even a world court
empowered to hear the kinds of disputes that could arise under FDA
agreements. If FDA were to lose confidence in the ability of an MOU
partner to abide by the terms of the agreement, what FDA is likely to
do is to return to the relationship that it had with that partner before
the agreement. For example, if it is an agreement on the exchange
of inspection reports on GMPs, where the Agency believes that the
quality or thoroughness of the inspection or the resulting report is
not at the level expected, FDA might cease to rely on the foreign
partner's inspections and resume or increase its inspections in that
country.
A provision included in 1994 as part of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, the implementing legislation for the World Trade
Organization agreements, requires notice and comment on FDA
findings that another country's "sanitary or phytosanitary measure,"
e.g., a country's seafood safety inspection system, is equivalent. 6 The
Id. at 368.
112
112

See Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
See 63 Fed. Reg. 17,744 (1998). See supra note 86 for additional notices rele-

vant to the sectoral annex one medical devices.
114 See 21 C.F.R. pt. 26 (1998).
115
17 F.3d 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
116

See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809
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provision, however, does not apply a similar notice-and-comment requirement as to agreements in other areas of FDA regulation. Where
Uruguay Round notice-and-comment process applies, FDA must undertake either rulemaking or a Federal Register notice, with opportunity for comment, whenever FDA makes a finding that another
country has an equivalent food safety measure. The law requires that
rulemaking be used for a determination of the equivalence of a foreign country's measure to a United States "measure that is required
to be promulgated as a rule under the [FFDCA] or other statute administered by [FDA]" and provides for use of a simple notice as to a
determination of equivalency of a foreign measure to a United States
"measure that is not required to be promulgated as a rule under the
[FFDCA] or other statute administered by [FDA]." Whether the
process followed is a proposed rule or a notice, the applicable standard is whether the foreign measure provides at least the same level
of sanitary or phytosanitary protection as the comparable federal
measure. FDA must provide an opportunity for interested persons to
comment on the proposed determination and not issue a final determination on the issue of equivalence without taking into account
the comments received.
One may ask, if FDA was already obliged to undertake noticeand-comment rulemaking before finding another country's food law
to be equivalent, why was it necessary for Congress to include this requirement in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act? Or did Congress
believe itself merely to be codifying an existing APA requirement?
Most likely, Congress, in enacting this provision, was merely carrying
out what it thought was the right policy outcome, i.e., that the public
should have the opportunity to participate in decisions affecting its
food supply, without focusing on whether the requirement was new
or a restatement of prior law.
FDA's view is that the Uruguay Round Agreements Act rulemaking requirement does not apply when an MOU merely records an
understanding between FDA and a foreign counterpart that producers in each country will simply comply with the other country's requirements. Under this approach, FDA has signed a non-binding
cooperative arrangement with the New Zealand seafood authorities." 7 This agreement consisted not of an equivalence determination, but of reciprocal statements as to compliance. FDA would not
(1994); 19 U.S.C. § 2578a (1994).

17
These authorities are the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Ministry
of Health of New Zealand. The agreement was signed on December 20, 1995, and
published in the Federal Register. See 61 Fed. Reg. 7,112 (1996).
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need to subject to notice-and-comment a finding that another country's system is not equivalent, any more than FDA is expected to use
rulemaking when it declines to initiate any other process leading to118
ward a decision when there is no requirement for such a decision.
D. A uthorityfor Mutual Recognition Agreements
References to MRAs in U.S. law are found in the Trade Agreements Act" 9 as well as in the FFDCA.1 20 The phrase "mutual recognition agreements," or "MRAs," has several meanings, but generally
means either reliance upon one another's conformity assessment system or, where such reliance is not practicable, exchange of the results of conformity assessments to assure that the receiving country's
requirements are met.
The European usage of "MRA" was heavily influenced by its internal market harmonization activities as aided by the European
Court of Justice interpretation of the Treaty of Rome. Mutual exchange of conformity assessment results was a key part of a new
European approach designed to facilitate the free flow of goods

118

A useful analysis is offered by Richard A. Merrill. See Richard A. Merrill, FDA

and Mutual Recognition Agreements: Five Models of Harmonization, supra note 111, at
135. Professor Merrill postulates five models for FDA international agreements: (1)
the agent-in-place model, in which a trading partner agrees to provide FDA with the
results of its work ("This kind of international agreement raises the fewest problems
with respect to the substantive requirements that FDA administers, and the fewest
issues of administrative process."); (2) the enforcement discretion agreement, in
which FDA agrees it will monitor less closely the products of a country whose domestic regulatory requirements FDA considers reliable; (3) the "deputy sheriff" model,
in which FDA commits - unconditionally or conditionally - to accept the results of
another country's efforts to verify compliance with FDA's requirements, with U.S.
law as the law being applied; (4) the "equivalence" model, in which the United
States agrees to accept another country's requirements as equivalent to FDA's requirements; and (5) the harmonization model, in which both sides need to change
regulatory requirements to achieve a common approach. Professor Merrill finds
rulemaking unnecessary for the first three models but probably necessary for the latter two. See id. at 136.
119
19 U.S.C. § 2541 provides in pertinent part:
The Trade Representative has responsibility for coordinating United
States discussions and negotiations with foreign countries for the purpose of establishing mutual agreements with respect to standardsrelated activities. In carrying out this responsibility, the Trade Representative shall inform and consult with any Federal Agency having expertise in the matters under discussion and negotiation.
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 2541 (1994), amended by Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
120 The FDA "mutual recognition" agreement authority is found in 21
U.S.C.
§ 383 (1994); see also 21 U.S.C. § 394 (1994).
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within2 the EU through the mutual recognition of the results of
tests.

1

MRAs among conformity assessment bodies are becoming
commonplace. A host of public and private sector entities, such as
bodies that accredit laboratories, are entering into MOUs and MRAs
with one another on conformity assessment practices. Generally,
these relate to either the recognition of the results of product testing
and quality system audits, or the exchange of reports from such testing or audits. Whether these agreements among non-governmental
conformity assessment bodies have any effect upon regulatory agencies depends upon the laws of each country in which such a body operates and whether the government has given official status to such a
body or the agreements it enters. This issue is becoming an important one, due to the trend toward increased use of private sector conformity assessment activities. In the United States, as to activities in
the FDA-regulated sector, these agreements have no official standing
unless FDA is a party to the agreement or otherwise provides for
these agreements to have some official status through a process such
as rulemaking or guidance documenting in which those affected by
such a decision have an opportunity for comments.
E. FDA HarmonizationPolicy
Even before FDAMA added explicit harmonization provisions to
FDA's statutory mandate, the Agency had published a harmonization
policy on World Standards Day, 1995,' 2 that summarized the
Agency's activities and thinking on this subject.
F

Harmonization: Drug Regulation

FDA's principal harmonization activity for drugs, the International Conference on Harmonization (ICH), is a highly successful
program that harmonizes requirements and guidelines for testing
drugs and biologics.123 ICH is an example of how FDA has joined
with counterparts in other countries to write harmonized guidelines
that protect the public and benefit industry by reducing duplicative
testing.

121

24

See Horton, FDLJDevice Harmonization,supra note 2, at 582.

M See 60

Fed. Reg. 53,078 (1995).
See Horton, FDLI Drug Harmonization,supra note 1, at 444-51 and articles cited
therein.
124 Id. This chapter includes a matrix showing
the dates of FDA publication of
proposed and final International Cooperation on Harmonization (ICH) documents.
See id. at 446-50.
123
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FDA's regulatory partners in ICH are the Commission for the
European Communities (European Commission), the European
Medicines Evaluation Agency, EU member country regulators, and
Japan's Ministry of Health and Welfare. Industry participants are the
European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries Associations, the
Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association of the United
States. The ICH Secretariat is administered in conjunction with the
International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations in Geneva, an international non-governmental organization.
Official observer status in ICH has been given to the World Health
Organization (WHO), the European Free Trade Association, and the
Health Protection Branch of Canada.
ICH has carried out its activities through large public meetings,
in each odd-numbered year, since 1991. ICH also uses an intense
schedule of continuous guideline-draftings by representatives of the
six ICH members, with approximately fifty working groups (Expert
Working Groups) that meet during peak work periods several times
each year. Generic drug manufacturers recently began to participate
in ICH meetings regarding guidelines and topics that could affect
their interests.
The work products of ICH created in these working groups have
consisted of a series of consensus guidance documents. These
documents, after successive ICH steps of review and acceptance, including an opportunity for public review and comment in each jurisdiction, are forwarded to the regulatory agencies with the expectation that they will be formally adopted by the agencies. The premise
of ICH is the harmonization of testing and of a core portion of the
"dossiers," or written submissions. The countries that employ ICH
guidelines, however, maintain separate approvals rather than negotiating MRAs on drug approvals. 125
125

Particularly as the EU moves toward an internal system for mutual recognition

of approvals, and ICH achieves success in harmonizing a considerable portion of the
technical documents required for drug approval, the issue of mutual recognition of
product approvals, as opposed to mutual recognition of GMPs, will arise more and
more. For discussions of the issue of recognition of approvals within the EU and at
the international level, see Horton, FDLIDrug Harmonization,supra note 1 at 470-73.

Under current law, FDA lacks authority to recognize other countries' approval systems, as approval authority is vested in the Secretary, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1994), and by
delegation, FDA, 21 C.F.R. § 5.10 (1998). Furthermore, FDA policies disfavor a
change in the law to enable such recognition. "With regard to the European Community, I believe that we should continue to standardize our requirements, but... it

should be up to each country to decide in the end whether a drug should be approved or not." RevitalizingNew Product Development From Clinical Trals Through FDA
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The other major area of pharmaceutical harmonization relevant
to the present discussion - and also relevant to the discussion later
in this article of the MRA with the EU - are GMPs. Internationally,
the WHO, in 1969, endorsed GMP requirements for drugs as consisting of "internationally recognized and respected standards," and
WHO has revised those requirements on several occasions.'
These
WHO GMPs were modeled upon FDA's drug GMPs. A recent FDA
analysis by the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research confirmed
this similarity as to written requirements. A current priority is increasing harmonization as to compliance and enforcement.2 7 Also,
FDA's rulemaking to clarify its GMPs with respect to validation requirements 12 8 may necessitate a re-review as to whether the WHO's
GMPs - and those of the EU'2 9 and other U.S. trading partners remain equivalent to FDA's.
Furthermore, the EU does not yet apply GMPs to bulk drugs, a
shortcoming that will impede progress in implementing the drug
GMP MRA with the EU, but that issue is being addressed.
Bulk drug GMPs for active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs)
are a current harmonization priority, with a new initiative in ICH that
attempts to unify disparate activities on this topic in FDA, the EU,
WHO, PIC/S,5' APEC, 32 and ICH. 3 Underlying this interest is the
recognition that, due to the increasing international commerce in
bulk pharmaceutical chemicals for use in drug manufacturing, adeReview: Hearing on S. 1477 Before the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 104th
Cong. 14 (1996) (statement of former Commissioner Kessler).
See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES No. 863, WHO
EXPERT COMMITTEE ON SPECIFICATIONS FOR PHARMACEUTICAL PREPARATIONS 155 (1996).
127 See PDA Interviews FDA's Stephanie Gray, PDA NEWSLETTER, Sept. 1995, at 1.
128 See 61 Fed. Reg. 20,104 (1996).
129 See Council Directive 193/30, 1991 O.J. 83-86 (laying down principles and
guidelines of good manufacturing practice for medicinal products for human use).
130 Bulk drugs are sometimes called "starter materials," and generally the interest
is in focusing attention upon active pharmaceuticalingredients (APIs).
131 The Pharmaceutical Inspection Cooperation Scheme (PIC/S)
is a cooperation
program that originated as an international agreement, the Convention for the Mutual Recognition of Inspection in respect of the Manufacture of Pharmaceutical
Products, commonly known as the Pharmaceutical Inspection Convention or PIC.
Most participants are European. Australia is also a member, and FDA representatives
12 participate actively in PIC/S.
APEC is a governmental forum comprised of 21 Pacific Rim
member economies: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua-New Guinea, People's Republic of
China, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, United
States, and Vietnam.
133 See INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HARMONISATION, IC-! Steering
Committee Embarks on Phase Two Harmonisation, PRESS REPORT, Feb. 1998 (available at
<http://www.pharmweb.net/pwmirror/pw9/ifpma/ich7.html>).
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quate attention to the GMP controls applied to ingredients, in the
country of origin, is essential to the safety and quality of these substances. Current safeguards used by FDA and other regulations e.g., finished dosage form manufacturers' checks of ingredients, inspections of manufacturers of key ingredients in products with proposed approvals pending, application to bulk drug manufacturers of
those general GMP requirements that are relevant, and controls over
the substances themselves through such measures as an ICH guideline on drug impurities1 3 4 - are helpful but do not meet the need for
a comprehensive approach. Particularly considering the fact that
bulk pharmaceutical chemicals are increasingly manufactured in developing countries such as China and India, a new ICH initiative to
draft harmonized GMPs applicable to APIs, for adoption and enforcement in all countries that produce such chemicals, is critically
important. 135

G. Harmonization: Medical Device Regulation
Many of FDA's medical device harmonization activities are carried out through a group known as the Global Harmonization Task
Force (GHTF). 36 The GHTF is FDA's highest priority for international device activities. Work on standards through the International
Standards Organization and other groups also remains vitally important. The GHTF is an informal grouping that includes government
and industry officials from Europe, North America, and Asia-Pacific.
Principal government participants are from the European Commission and the fifteen countries of the EU, the United States, Canada,
Japan, and Australia. The GHTF has four work groups known as
study groups, dealing with product approval-related issues, adverse
event reporting, GMPs (now called quality systems requirements),
and audits of quality systems.

See infra note 135.
In early 1998, the participants in ICH decided to develop an ICH guideline on
APIs, an activity that may in the future be extended to inactive ingredients, such as
excipients, as well. This activity will be done in conjunction with PIC/S and WHO,
and began with a joint meeting in April, 1998. Thus, existing activities are likely to
134
35

be folded into a group that will be treated as comprising at least PIC/S, WHO, and
ICH, and focused initially on APIs. A GMP on inactive ingredient GMPs remains a
future possibility.
136
See Horton, FDLI Device Harmonization,supra note 2, at 587-88.
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MUTUAL RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS
III.

A.

FDA Policy on Agreements with Regulatory Counterpartsin Other
Countries

FDA has expressed support for agreements with other countries
to enhance public health protection and facilitate commerce in safe
and quality food, drugs, and medical devices consistent with public
health protection and the requirements of the law, through a 1995
policy document on initiating, developing, and monitoring MOUs
that was set forth in a Compliance Policy Guide (Guide):
It is the policy of FDA to pursue the development of MOU's
that will further the agency's public health mission [and are] designed to meet the following goals:
(1) To enhance FDA's ability to ensure that regulated products are safe, effective, of good quality, and properly labeled;
(2) To allow FDA to utilize its resources more effectively or
efficiently, without compromising its ability to carry out its responsibilities; and
(3) To improve communications between
37 FDA and foreign
products.
regulated
FDA
concerning
officials
The Guide described three long-standing categories of FDA
MOUs as examples: (1) reciprocal agreements with countries having
the same or similar systems, (2) agreements dealing with certification
of imports or exports, and (3) agreements to formalize communication and cooperation in the interest of harmonization, improved
FDA decision-making, and reduced expenditures on import control. 38

A variety of MOUs is possible: (1) A cooperation MOU, exemplified by an agreement signed by FDA and its counterparts in Canada and Mexico (Memorandum of Cooperation in FDA International
Cooperative Agreements Manual), contemplates mutual cooperation
and information-sharing activities; (2) A compliance MOU, which
may be reciprocal or one-way, contemplates compliance by the exporting country with the requirements of the importing country; (3)
An equivalence MOU contemplates a finding that the other country
has a regulatory system equivalent to FDA's; as discussed above, notice-and-comment requirements may come into play when FDA

,7
18

60 Fed. Reg. 31,485 (1995).
See id.
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makes a determination that another country's regulatory food system
is equivalent.
FDA insists upon equivalence as a prerequisite to mutual recognition. Therefore, in FDA's usage, MRAs might be viewed as a high
order of agreement, a reciprocal agreement reached after a finding
that the MOU partner's system is sufficiently trustworthy that FDA
can safely reduce coverage of the product from the other country. A
few long-standing FDA MOUs contain mutual recognition features,
including several agreements on good laboratory practices. Also, for
more than a quarter century FDA has had MOUs with regulatory
counterparts in Canada39 and Sweden"' ° that include mutual acceptance of results from inspections for compliance with GMPs. Likewise, FDA and its counterparts in Australia and the U.K. have similar
agreements under which reports are exchanged on device GMP in4
spections. 1'

Not all agreements are reciprocal, nor need they be to offer
benefits to both sides. An example are the MOUs reached between
FDA and its Russian counterparts. 42 Although the MOUs address
regulatory cooperation and are not reciprocal in that they facilitate
the marketing in Russia of FDA-approved drugs without corresponding provisions on marketing in the United States of drugs approved
by Russian authorities, they benefited Russia by assisting in the
prompt access to high-quality U.S. products at a time of medical
product shortages. Further, they helped Russia by facilitating increased emphasis by Russian authorities on more problematic products entering Russia from other parts of the world.
FDA has more than fifty agreements with its counterparts in
other countries. The Agency publishes these agreements in the Federal Register' and periodically publishes a compilation of them. 44
These agreements generally are called "memoranda of understanding" (MOUs) or, if needed by the foreign counterpart,

13,

See FDA, Agreement of Cooperation Between the Canadian Department of National

Health and Welfare and the Food and Drug Administration, Sept. 28, 1973, in INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS MANuAL 39-41 (Nov. 1996) [hereinafter FDA,
CanadianAgreement]. (The Canadian Department of National Health and Welfare is
now called Health Canada).
140 See FDA, Memorandum of Agreement Between the Swedish
National Board of Health
and the Food and Drug Administration, Oct. 17, 1972, in INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE
AGREEMENTS MANUAL 337-39 (Nov. 1996).
141 See id. at 17-20, 353-56.
142 See id. at 287, 295,
325.
143
14

See 21 C.F.R. §§ 10.90(d), 20.108 (1998).
See FDA,

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS MANUAL 59-62

(Nov. 1996).
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"arrangements" or "memoranda of cooperation" (MOCs). As has
been discussed, some of these agreements are closely related to
"mutual recognition features" in that they call for exchange of inspection results.
The equivalence provisions in the World Trade Organization
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures have spawned numerous efforts to define what should enter into
countries' findings that others' food safety systems are equivalent. In
1997, FDA published in the Federal Register a proposed guidance
document concerning its determinations of equivalence of other
countries' food control systems. 145 The final guidance, to be issued by
FDA in the future, will be useful in FDA's determination of food system equivalence generally, including implementation of FDA's 1995
seafood regulation.1 4 6 This regulation includes provisions on imported seafood that have the effect of streamlining the requirements
on importers if they purchase seafood from countries whose regulatory bodies have equivalence agreements or compliance agreements
with FDA.14 7 In 1998, the expectation was that FDA would begin to
propose determinations of equivalence of other countries' seafood
systems, possibly starting with Canada. Because of the requirement
that FDA employ a notice-and-comment process in its food safety
equivalence determinations - as a result of the 1994 Uruguay
Round Agreements Act""8 discussed above - FDA is expected to undertake a notice-and-comment process with respect to each equivalence determination entered into under this regulation. A country
that has agreed to commit that its exports to the United States will
comply with FDA requirements would not require a notice-andcomment process, as discussed elsewhere in this Article.
A draft guideline that the Agency is helping to shepherd
through the United Nations Food Standards Programme, known as
the Codex Alimentarius Commission, is useful in articulating
"equivalence." In the Codex Committee on Import, Export, Food
Inspection and Certification Systems, FDA was the rapporteur for
"Proposed Draft Guidelines for the Development of Equivalence
145 See 62 Fed. Reg. 30,593
(1997).
146
47

See 21 C.F.R_ pt. 123 (1998).

See 21 C.F.R. § 123.12 (1998).

In a compliance agreement, each side pledges

that its exporting processors will meet the requirements of the importing country.
1
See 19 U.S.C. § 2578a (1994). FDA is singled out in this statute because use of
a notice-and-comment rulemaking process was already the practice of the Food
Safety Inspection Service of USDA. See, for example, the addition of Mexico to the
list of countries eligible to export poultry products into the United States. See 62
Fed. Reg. 63,284 (1997).
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Agreements Regarding, Food Import and Export Inspection and Certification Systems" that may be adopted as Codex Guidelines as early
as 1999.4 9 Also, FDA and United States Department of Agriculture
officials are contributing to the development of a related document
that discusses issues concerning the judgment of equivalence. 50
B. Harmonization: Equivalence or Mutual Recognition?
As may be evident, the term MRA has become popular among
those involved in regulations, trade, standards, and conformity assessment discussions. Yet those who use the term do not always use it
in the same way. A fundamental question is always: whose requirements are being met?
Is it the "customer's" requirements that are being met, i.e., the
importing country? Private testing bodies such as Underwriters
Laboratories, for example, test to the requirements of the customer.
The international analogue is that the conformity assessment be
done in accordance with the laws of the importing country. Or, conversely, is it the supplier's requirements that are being met, i.e., those
of the exporting country's? There is a widespread desire in industry
to be able to export if the requirements of the exporting country
have been met. For example, a United States-EU industry meeting
known as the Transatlantic Business Dialogue has espoused the concept of "tested once, accepted everywhere."
From an FDA standpoint, there must be considerable harmonization for the Agency to enter an agreement that relies upon another
country's system of GMPs or other aspects of product conformity.
There is also the possibility of an uneven playing field to the disadvantage of domestic producers if they continue to be held to stricter
domestic requirements while foreign competitors operate in countries whose laws and enforcement are laxer yet whose products could
enter the U.S. market based solely on compliance with the laws of the
foreign competitor. Clearly, equivalence contemplates more Chan
laws that, on paper alone, provide an equivalent level of protection.
Unless equivalence is achieved in the application and enforcement of
written legal requirements, an uneven playing field may develop.
Under FDA law and policy, an MRA contemplates a finding that the

149 Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme,
Report of-the Sixth Session of the
Codex Committee on Food Import and Export Inspection and Certification Systems, Codex
Alimentarius Commission, 6th Sess., App. II, at 37, ALINORM 99/30 (1998).
15
See id., Agenda Item 8, at 41-52 (paper prepared by New Zealand
with assistance from Australia, Canada, and the United States, CX/FICS 98/7).
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other country has an equivalent regulatory system to FDA's in its application as well as its wording.
C. U.S.-EU MRA
From 1994 to 1998, FDA's principal focus of activity in the area
of agreements with other countries concerning drugs and devices has
entailed negotiations with the European Commission, aimed at mutual reliance on one another's inspections. An MRA between the
U.S. government and the European Commission (EU MRA) with annexes on drugs and devices was initialed by the two sides on June 20,
1997, signed on May 18, 1998, and is now in the early stages of implementation, beginning with a three-year transitional phase inaugurated by an exchange of letters on October 30, 1998.15' A summary of
the EU MRA is provided in an Appendix to this Article.
The discussions that led to the EU agreement were part of broad
negotiations on a mutual recognition agreement led by the Office of
the United States Trade Representative. These negotiations included
not only drug GMPs and medical devices, but also telecommunications, electrical safety, and recreational craft GMPs. The European
Commission's insistence on a "balanced package" meant that it
would not agree to MRAs on telecommunications and recreational
craft -

viewed as advantageous to the United States -

unless there

also was MRA coverage of pharmaceuticals - viewed as advantageous
to the EU. (More pharmaceuticals are exported to the United States
from the EU than are imported.)
The European Commission's goal in seeking MRAs was to facilitate the marketing in other countries of drugs and devices produced
in the EU, through the reduction of both foreign inspections for
drugs and devices and border batch testing for drugs. Also, for
medical devices the European Commission hoped that FDA could
delegate to EU conformity assessment bodies the task of assuring that
all FDA requirements had been satisfied. The latter objective was inconsistent with FDA's authority and policies, so the agreement
reached was more modest in its purpose and effect.
Regarding both drugs and devices, the EU MRA provides for the
exchange of inspection reports on compliance with GMPs. The
agreement was facilitated by the fact that the United States and the
EU have already harmonized major parts of the GMP requirements
for both categories of products. As noted earlier, the EU still needs
151 AGREEMENT ON MUTUAL RECOGNITION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, June 20, 1997 (available at <http://www.ustr.gov>).
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to enact GMP requirements for active pharmaceutical ingredients.
Furthermore, considerable confidence-building work, and probably
harmonization activities, will be needed on the conduct of inspections and on what follow-up action is taken in cases of nonconformity.
D. Rulemaking on the MRA
FDA published a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal
Register inviting comments on the MRA and its implementation, as
well as a final rule. 152 Comments were received from domestic and
foreign manufacturers and consumer organizations. Of course, the
Agency will evaluate potential enhancements as EU and FDA policies
evolve. The agreement thus provides a solid ongoing basis for furtherjoint work.
E. Effect of FDAMA on the Device MRA
Due to FDAMA, FDA will need to seek changes in the lists of devices eligible for the pre-market assessment provisions that are appended to the sectoral annex on medical devices. This is because
FDAMA eliminated the 510(k) pre-market notification requirement
for most Class I devices and certain Class II devices. 5" These exemptions will eliminate the need for these devices to be subjected to the
pre-market notification assessment provisions of the MRA, although
the devices remain subject to the quality system GMP aspects of the
MRA. FDAMA also provides for expansion of the third-party approach to many more Class II devices, once guidance documents are
written for third-party reviews. At the same time, four devices needed
to be deleted from the MRA, due to provisions in FDAMA that disallowed use of third parties to review permanently implantable devices
or life sustaining devices.'4
The MRA builds upon the fact that FDA had conducted a pilot
program of third-party review by private sector bodies of pre-market
notifications (510(k)s) for certain devices. FDAMA codified this pilot
program. This new law includes provisions consistent with the MRA
in two respects: FDA needs to "accredit" conformity assessment bodies (rather than relying upon accreditations by the EU countries or

152

See 63 Fed. Reg. 17,744 (1998).

See supra note 86 for additional notices rele-

vant to the sectoral annex on medical devices.
15
See 63 Fed. Reg. 3,142 (1998); 63 Fed. Reg. 5,387 (1998).
154 See FFDCA § 523; 21 U.S.C.A. § 360m (West Supp. 1998).
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other MRA partners), and FDA needs to make the final decisions on
product approvals.'5 5
F.

Agreements with Other Countries: Plan on Recognition of GMP
Inspections

Because of FDA resources involved in implementing the confidence-building and equivalence-determination aspects of the EU
MRA, finding time for similar activities with other countries will be
difficult. One approach under consideration is a straightforward
agreement to cooperate and exchange inspection reports, without
efforts by either side to limit the ability of the other to perform inspections, to require additional information from firms, or to make
whatever use of an inspection report the regulator receiving it sees
fit. An agreement of this type with Australia's Therapeutic Goods
Administration is under review in FDA.
In recent years, FDA and its counterparts in Canada and Switzerland' 5 initiated discussions relating to an updated drug GMP agreement, which would modernize MOUs with those countries that have
aided international cooperation for more than a quarter of a century.

57

FDA is likely to resume these activities in coming years.

On May 20, 1998, as required by FDAMA,'58 FDA made public a
"plan that establishes a framework for achieving mutual recognition
of good manufacturing practices inspections."' 59 This plan highlighted both the desirability of agreements with other countries and
the practical impediments that stand in the way. Explaining that
"FDA's limited resources force the Agency to focus on certain high
priorities in these general areas which are likely to have the most significant impact on protecting the domestic public health, '"'O the plan
described the Agency's current priority areas to include:

155 See

id.
See Agreed Minutes of Meeting between FDA officials and Swiss officials (July
9, 1998) (on file with the Seton Hall Law Review).
157 See Letter from Dean Rusk, Secretary of State,
dated Oct. 28, 1968, in response
to letter from Felix Schnyder, Ambassador of Switzerland, dated June 28, 1968, (on
file with FDA, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS MANUAL 341-42 (Nov.
1996)); see also FDA, CanadianAgreement, supra note 139.
158 21 U.S.C.A. § 383(c) (4)
(West Supp. 1998).
159 FDA Homepage (visited Nov. 2, 1998) <http://www.fda.gov/oc/fdama/
fdamagmp.html> (to view this plan).
156

160

Id.
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* Implementing the EU MRA;
* Completing harmonization projects essential to the future
success of that MRA, e.g., GMPs for APIs and inspectional
guides for device GMP inspections;
" Strengthening long-standing arrangements on exchange of
inspection information with other countries; and
" Seeking opportunities
for low-cost arrangements for informa6
tion exchange.' '

Therefore, under the latter two elements of the Agency's priorities, continued efforts will be made to strengthen existing agreements with Switzerland and Canada, and unilateral or reciprocal arrangements, such as access to one another's databases on compliance
status, may be undertaken.
IV. CONCLUSION

FDA's activities on harmonization and agreements with other
countries are both promising and complex, raising a host of legal
and policy issues for the Agency, other parts of the U.S. governments
and foreign counterparts. These initiatives are an important part of
FDA's vision for the next century, as the Agency expects to rely on
the efforts of equivalent foreign authorities as partners in consumer
protection.
V. APPENDIX
Summary of the MRA with the EU on Drugs and Devices'62
The EU MRA includes two sectoral annexes covering pharmaceuticals and medical devices, products regulated by FDA. The
pharmaceutical annex covers post- and pre-approval good manufacturing practice inspections, and the medical device annex covers
quality system audits and pre-market evaluation reports of certain
medical devices. The annexes describe systems under which the participating parties, regulatory authorities, and CABs will exchange information concerning the products and processes subject to the annexes. The annexes also describe how the participating parties will
See id.
162 See Summary of the FDA-Related Elements of the "Agreement on Mutual Recognition

161

Between the United States of America and the European Community" (visited Nov. 2, 1998)
<http://www.fda.gov/oia/mrasum.htm> (FDA posted this document as a companion to its April 10, 1998 proposed rule (63 Fed. Reg. 17,744 (1998))). The entire
Appendix relies heavily upon this summary. The author is indebted to work done by
Anne Miller, Office of the Chief Counsel, FDA, on this summary.
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regard information they receive pursuant to the annexes. Neither
annex changes current FDA regulation of these product areas.
The EU MRA also includes an "umbrella agreement," which describes a system for the efficient functioning of the MRA's annexes.
Several provisions in the umbrella agreement will not apply to FDA's
activities under its sectoral annexes. For example, umbrella provisions concerning CABs do not apply to the pharmaceutical annexes,
because these annexes do not utilize CABs. In addition, because the
medical device annex includes its own, specific provisions governing
CABs, the umbrella provisions regarding CABs will not usually apply.
Article 22.2 of the umbrella agreement provides that when there is
an inconsistency between the annexes and the umbrella, provisions
in the sectoral annexes will apply in the first instance.
The umbrella includes a number of provisions, however, that
can affect FDA's operation under its sectoral annexes. Examples of
such provisions include the provision establishing the Joint Sectoral
Committee (Article 14 of the umbrella agreement) and the provision
regarding confidentiality (Article 17 of the umbrella agreement).
PharmaceuticalGMPAnnex
The stated purpose of the pharmaceutical GMP annex is to

"govern the exchange ... and normal endorsement ... of official

Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP) inspection reports after a transitional period aimed at determination of the equivalence of the
regulatory systems of the Parties .... " To this end, the annex de-

scribes activities and processes that will occur during two distinct periods, the transitional period and the operational period, which will
lead to exchange and possible normal endorsement of pharmaceutical GMP inspection reports. The annex applies to certain types of
pharmaceutical products, which are described in the annex. An indicative list of products subject to the annex appears in Appendix 3
of the annex.
Immediately after the effective date of the EU MRA, FDA and
the appropriate regulatory authorities in the EU will begin a threeyear transition period. During this period FDA will participate in
confidence-building activities with its counterpart pharmaceutical
regulatory authorities in the EU. Such activities will include information exchange, joint training, and joint inspections. The purpose of
the activities will be to enable FDA eventually to assess equivalence of
its counterpart regulatory authorities in the EU and to enable these
authorities eventually to assess equivalence of FDA. FDA and EU
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regulatory authorities will assess equivalence according to certain criteria, which are found in Appendix 4 of the annex.
According to Article 1.1 of the annex, "equivalence" means that
the "regulatory systems are sufficiently comparable to assure that the
process of inspection and the ensuing inspection reports will provide
adequate information to determine whether respective statutory and
regulatory requirements of the authorities have been fulfilled."
Equivalence does not, however, require that the systems have
"identical procedures."
At the end of the three-year transition period, FDA will make
equivalence determinations of each EU regulatory authority that participated in the confidence-building activities. The EU regulatory
authorities which participated in the confidence-building activities
will, likewise, make an equivalence determination of FDA. The determinations will be based on the body of evidence assessed during
the transition period, and determinations of equivalence will be
made upon a showing of "a demonstrated pattern of consistent performance" in accordance with the criteria in Appendix 4.
To monitor activities performed under this annex, the parties
will establish a 'Joint Sectoral Committee" (Committee), which will
be co-chaired by a representative of FDA and a representative from
the EU. Each representative will vote on each matter before the
Committee, and decisions in the Committee will be taken by unanimous consent. The Committee's functions include, among other
things, making a joint assessment of equivalence of the authorities at
the end of the transition period. After the joint assessment, the
Committee will create a list of authorities determined to be equivalent, based on FDA determination as to EU authorities and EU determination as to FDA. Authorities not listed as equivalent at that
time may apply for reconsideration at a later date.
After equivalence determinations have been completed, the operational period will begin. During this period, equivalent authorities may exchange pharmaceutical GMP inspection reports. Postapproval GMP inspection reports for products covered under this
annex will be transmitted to the regulatory authority requesting such
a report within sixty calendar days of the request. In some instances,
the regulatory authority receiving a request may not possess a current
GMP inspection report for the particular manufacturing establishment that is the subject of the request. In this situation, a "new" inspection must be performed, and the resulting inspection report will
be transmitted to the requesting authority within ninety calendar
days from the request.

1998]

MUTUAL RECOGNITION A GREEMENTS

For transmission of pre-approval GMP inspection reports,
equivalent regulatory authorities will give preliminary notification
that an inspection may need to take place. Within fifteen calendar
days of the notification, the regulatory authority requested to perform an inspection will acknowledge receipt of the notice and will
confirm its ability to perform the inspection. If the authority performs such inspection, the resulting report will be sent to the requesting authority within forty-five calendar days of the request. The
request must, however, include appropriate information and the precise issues to be addressed during the inspection. If, in an exceptional case, an authority requests a report to be transmitted in a
shorter time, it must describe the exceptional circumstances in the
request. If a regulatory authority is unable to perform the inspection
as requested, the authority making the request will have the right to
conduct the inspection itself.
Once an equivalent authority receives an inspection report from
another equivalent authority (post- or pre-approval reports), the receiving authority will "normally endorse" the report. Normal endorsement will be based on findings in the report as they are measured against the importing country's own laws. In other words, FDA
may normally endorse an inspection report from an equivalent EU
authority based on what the report says about compliance with U.S.
GMP laws and regulations. Normal endorsement will occur "except
under specific and delineated circumstances," and will be "based on
the determination of equivalence in light of the experience gained."
(See Article 12 of the annex.) The effect of this language is not only
to allow a receiving authority to accept findings stated in a report
transmitted by another equivalent authority, but also to allow a receiving authority to make final determinations of GMP compliance.
Thus, assuming it is found to be equivalent, FDA will retain the ability to make final determinations as to compliance with U.S. GMP laws
and regulations. FDA expects, however, that it will be able to accept
most findings in the inspection reports it receives from equivalent
authorities.
The pharmaceutical annex contains several other provisions that
govern its operation. For example, equivalent authorities will participate in activities to monitor equivalence, including review of inspection reports, a limited number ofjoint inspections, and common
training sessions. In addition, during the transitional period, the
authorities will develop an alert system, and means of exchanging information on confirmed problem reports, corrective actions, recalls,
rejected import consignments, and other regulatory and enforce-
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ment problems for products subject to this annex. In addition, during the operational period, each party has the right to request suspension of an equivalent authority.
Finally, a crucial provision affirming the regulatory authorities'
role in protecting the public health recognizes that regulatory
authorities may fulfill their "legal responsibilities by taking actions
necessary to ensure the protection of human and animal health."
The authorities may take such actions in accordance with the level of
protection they consider appropriate. (See Article 21 of the annex.)
MedicalDevice Annex'

The medical device annex's stated purpose is "to specify the
conditions under which a Party will accept the results of quality system-related evaluations and inspections and pre-market evaluations
of the other Party ... as conducted by listed conformity assessment
bodies (CABs) and to provide for other related cooperative activities." The annex applies to exchange and possible endorsement of
certain types of reports from equivalent CABs, including surveillance/post-market and initial/pre-approval inspection reports, premarket (510(k)) product evaluation reports, quality system evaluation reports (as referred to in the EU), and examination and verification reports (as referred to in the EU).
Similar to the pharmaceutical GMP annex, the medical device
annex is based on the concept of equivalence. Under the medical
device annex, equivalence means the following: CABs in the EU are
capable of conducting product and quality systems evaluations
against U.S. regulatory requirements in a manner equivalent to those
conducted by FDA; and CABs in the United States are capable of
conducting product and quality systems evaluations against EU regulatory requirements in a manner equivalent to those conducted by
EU CABs.' 64
The concept of equivalence will apply to the three distinct components of the medical device annex, each covering a discrete range
of products. The three components are: quality system evaluations,
which will be exchanged with regard to all products regulated as
medical devices under both U.S. and EU law; product evaluation reports, which will be exchanged only with regard to those products
classified under the U.S. system as Class I and Class II-Tier 2 medical
For additional guidance, see 63 Fed. Reg. 28,392 (1998); 63 Fed. Reg. 36,240
(1998).
164 See 63 Fed. Reg. 36,240 (1998).
1
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devices (listed in Appendix 2 of the annex); and post-market vigilance reports, which will be exchanged with regard to all products
regulated as medical devices under both U.S. and EU law.
The medical device annex, like the pharmaceutical GMP annex,
includes a three-year transitional period, which will begin immediately after entry into force of the EU MRA. During this period, parties will participate in confidence-building activities in an effort to
obtain a sufficient body of evidence to make equivalence determinations of CABs. Such activities include seminars and workshops, exchange of information, joint training exercises, and observed inspections. The parties will designate CABs to participate in these
activities by transmitting a list of CABs that meet technical competence and independence criteria, which are found in Appendix 1 of
the medical device annex. During the transition period, the parties
also will jointly determine the information that must be present in
quality system and product evaluation reports, and they will jointly
develop a notification and alert system, which will be used in cases of
defects, recalls, and other problems.
During the last six months of the transition period, the parties
will make a joint assessment of equivalent CABs that participated in
the confidence-building activities. CABs found to be equivalent will
have demonstrated proficiency by submitting a sufficient number of
adequate reports. Equivalence assessment of a particular CAB may
be limited in scope; a list of equivalent CABs and a full explanation
of the scope of their equivalence eventually will be found in Appendix 5 of the medical devices annex. Decisions concerning CAB
equivalence must be agreed to by both parties. CABs not listed for
participation in confidence building activities, or listed for certain
types of evaluations, may apply for participation at a later date once
necessary measures have been taken or sufficient experience has
been gained.
After the transition period and the establishment of a list of
equivalent CABs, the parties will begin the operational period, and
the operational period will apply only to those CABs found to be
equivalent. The parties will exchange information on quality system
evaluation reports and product evaluation reports. Exchange of
quality system evaluation reports during the operational period will
proceed as follows:

734

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:692

o European CABs listed as equivalent will provide FDA with full

quality system evaluation reports for pre-approval quality system evaluations;
o European CABs listed as equivalent will provide FDA with abbreviated surveillance quality system evaluation reports;
o U.S. CABs listed as equivalent will provide the EU Notified
Body (chosen by the manufacturer) full reports of initial
quality system evaluations and abbreviated reports of quality
system surveillance audits.
When a CAB listed as equivalent receives a request for a quality
system evaluation report, it will transmit the report within sixty calendar days of the request. In the event that a party requests a new inspection (e.g., when there is not a current quality system evaluation
report), the CAB will have an extra thirty calendar days to transmit
the report to the requesting party. If an inspection cannot be performed within the specified period of time, the requesting party may
perform the inspection on its own.
Similar to the GMP reports exchanged under the pharmaceutical annex, quality system evaluation reports prepared by listed CABs
and exchanged under the medical device annex will normally be endorsed by the party receiving the information. The party will normally endorse such reports except under specific and delineated circumstances, and based on the determination of equivalence in light
of the experience gained.
Exchange of product evaluation reports will proceed as follows:
o EU CABs found equivalent for the purpose of exchanging
such reports will provide FDA with 510(k) pre-market notification assessment reports, prepared to U.S. medical device
requirements;
o U.S. CABs, subject to the specifications and limitations on the
list of equivalent CABs, will provide to the EU Notified Body
(chosen by the manufacturer) type examination and verification reports prepared to EU medical device requirements.
Transmission of these product evaluation reports will take place
according to the receiving party's specified procedures. Product
evaluation reports prepared by listed CABs and exchanged under this
annex will normally be endorsed by the party receiving the reports,
except under specific and delineated circumstances, and based on
the determination of the CABs's equivalence in light of the experience gained. Additional activities under this annex include monitoring CABs listed as equivalent, listing of additional CABs during the
operational phase, continued participation in activities of the GHTF
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for medical devices, establishing an alert system and contact points,
and establishing ajoint Sectoral Committee.
Under an MOU between FDA and the Office of the United
States Trade Representative, FDA speaks for the government on discussions relating to FDA's regulatory responsibilities and authority, in
both the Joint Committee under the umbrella agreement and in the
Joint Sectoral Committees for drugs and devices.

